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Abstract 
 
Zoning as a method for development regulation has always been effective, though in recent 
years innovative alternatives to conventional zoning are being implemented in an attempt to 
facilitate improved planning outcomes. This project looks critically at three zoning 
alternatives; performance zoning, Transect Planning, and Houston’s no-zoning to determine 
the extent to which each alternative improves upon conventional zoning. Each alternative 
was qualitatively measured on its ability to reverse four generally agreed upon zoning flaws 
while maintaining three of its benefits. The findings point to real successes in each of the 
three alternatives, particularly transect planning, but uncover unavoidable inadequacies in 
each as well. In light of these findings, a new zoning alternative called the Sustainable 
Development Deviation method is proposed that may better solve the problems of zoning 
while being consistent with good planning principles. In the place of rigid zoning is a 
recommended zoning map. Reasonable deviations from recommended land uses are allowed 
in lieu of a linkage fee with which the municipality can ensure that environment and equity 
outcomes are not inhibited. Using this method, new development can increase economic 
outcomes while maintaining ecology and equity outcomes, thus creating increased optimality 
in the balance between economy, ecology and equity. It is believed that this method allows 
both developers and planners to achieve their professional goals while resulting in higher 
quality planning outcomes.   
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Section I: Introduction 
 
Introduction/Project Purpose 
 
More than any other process, zoning defines city planning. Its prominent role in municipal 
regulations since New York City introduced the first zoning ordinance in 1916 has profoundly 
affected the built form of the American landscape. The separation of incompatible land uses in an 
attempt to protect public welfare is a noble and, for the most part, realized aim. Yet for all its history 
and its nearly universal use, it is by no means perfect. Opponents claim that the sprawling landscapes 
of contemporary development, the increased reliance on the automobile and subsequent effects on 
quality of life are evidence of the unintended consequences of Euclidian zoning. As such, these 
opponents are attempting to find alternate methods of land use management in an effort to stem the 
tide of this undesired outcomes. 
The aim of this project is twofold. One is to evaluate the efficacy of three popular zoning 
alternatives by determining the extent to which they solve four key zoning flaws while still 
remaining consistent with three key zoning benefits. The explanation and defense of these seven 
evaluation criteria, along with analysis of zoning alternative efficacy are the focus of Section II of this 
project. The other aim of this study is to offer a new alternative that solves more of the problems of 
zoning while maintaining a strong connection to the tenets of good planning, and in the process 
provide a compromise between the sometimes divergent goals of developers and planners. This new 
alternative, called the Sustainable Development Deviation method, is the focus of Section III.  
In order to accomplish the dual aims of this project, an extensive literature review on zoning, 
zoning alternatives and development management was undertaken. In a few instances, calls to 
relevant planning officials were made to clarify details about particular zoning alternatives, but the 
vast majority of the work done for this project was through literature review and independent 
thought. It is hoped that this project will further the understanding of the relevance of popular 
zoning alternatives, and perhaps spark new ideas about how better to ensure positive planning 
outcomes through land development regulation.  
 
SECTION II: Evaluating Zoning Alternatives 
 
Conventional zoning, while in near-ubiquitous use as a method of land development 
management, has many opponents. In recent years zoning alternatives have arisen that attempt to 
create better planning outcomes than those created by conventional zoning. The question arises then 
as to whether or not these attempts are the improvements some claim them to be. This section will 
attempt to answer that question by formulating evaluation criteria based on key zoning flaws and 
benefits, then evaluating the extent to which each zoning alternative solves conventional zoning’s 
flaws while retaining its benefits. In this way, each regulatory method can be evaluated as a model 
and then compared to its peers without having to use an experimentally complex evaluation of 
planning outcomes in communities utilizing zoning alternatives. To begin, the seven evaluation 
criteria are identified. 
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Evaluation Criteria: Zoning Flaws and Benefits 
 
Zoning would not have the track record it has if not for its efficacy as a development 
management tool. There are numerous positive aspects to conventional zoning, but three such aspects 
will be considered in particular. First and foremost zoning allows for the separation of incompatible 
land uses. This is particularly relevant for residential neighborhoods, whose health and welfare can 
be radically diminished by different types of non-residential (mainly industrial) development. 
Secondly, zoning provides clear and easily understood level of security in land acquisition and 
development. In particular, it allows home buyers to feel secure in their investment. Rezonings are 
common enough that they can dampen that security, but not so rampant that they undo it. As will be 
discussed in more detail in following sections, zoning alternatives often come under fire due to 
citizen concern, legitimate or not, that the alternatives do not provide that same level of security. 
This is a clear indicator of the importance of homebuyer security in land regulation. Finally, zoning 
has logical connection to the tenets of “good” planning as defined by Urban Land Use Planning 
(Kaiser et al 1995), in particular the sustainable balance of economy, ecology and equity. Briefly, this 
definition of good planning holds that optimal planning outcomes stem from ensuring that 
development occurs in harmony with the public goods of ecology and equity. Planners that account 
for these distinct – and often divergent – needs will have the greatest effect on city form. Zoning aids 
this balance by ensuring that economic development occurs in areas that increase equity while 
minimizing environmental impact. As such it is a powerful tool, and one that has for the most part 
justified its prolonged existence. 
While zoning is a potent management tool, it has its faults. There are innumerable sources for 
arguments against zoning. Conservationists, libertarians, developers and planners all claim of zoning’s 
fallibility. The divergent interests of these groups are evidence that there is something not quite right 
with the conventional zoning process. Porter et al (1988) synthesize many of these claims into four 
main arguments against zoning. The first is that traditional zoning is static. The second is that it is 
parochial instead of regional. Thirdly it cannot ensure high-quality development, and finally, it leads 
to administrative problems so common to local jurisdictions. These are all valid complaints and must 
be examined closer.  
To begin, zoning is indeed static as Porter claims. Despite planner’s interests in updating their 
plans as often as possible, updates are few and far between and are just as likely to be reactionary as 
visionary, counter to the comprehensive planning process. While communities change dynamically, 
the method for controlling and regulating that change is not. This will always be a flaw in 
conventional zoning, and in the comprehensive planning process as a whole. Without a planning 
system that incorporates dynamic change, the potential for planning error will remain. 
The second argument, that zoning is parochial rather than regional, is certainly true. Nearly 
all development projects are approved by single jurisdictions, but these projects can still have regional 
effects, whether they are on economy, environment or equity. One need look no further than 
projects in Durham like New Hope Commons or the Streets at Southpoint to see that development 
projects can have regional effects but parochial rationales. These type of projects alter transportation 
and land use patterns, job placement and spending patterns for multiple jurisdictions due to their 
placement in regionally convenient locations (like along major transportation corridors at the border 
of  the city), though the financial benefits accrue only to one city. In this and other examples, one 
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community’s zoning ordinance may burden another community unfairly, spurning regional 
responsibility for the sake of parochial self-interest.  
Next, the concern over administrative hurdles is a serious one. The administrative problems 
in local jurisdictions can severely erode the efficacy of zoning ordinances, hindering planner’s 
attempts at optimally balanced outcomes. It is through administrative loopholes like rezoning that 
many of planning’s inequities are manifest. One of zoning’s strongest features is the security is 
provides land owners. Those with political and administrative influence can strip that security away 
for their own benefit, while those who have been affected by a rezoning change are often powerless 
to stop it. In some occasions, those affected parties are given some compensation, but there is no 
administrative procedure that can ensure that the compensation is reasonable or equitable. As long as 
there is zoning, there will be rezoning and variances and grandfathering. And as long as these 
loopholes exist, there will be opportunity to exploit zoning for personal gain and community expense. 
This is a serious flaw and as such will be included in the evaluation criteria.  
Finally, the fact that zoning cannot ensure high-quality development, only the types of 
development, while true is not as worthwhile an argument as the previous three. This argument does 
not seem to be well defined. It is unclear whether Porter refers to building quality or community 
quality. Building quality can always be measured by safety standards and architectural guidelines, but 
community quality will not necessarily have stable quantifiable standards. Determining the quality of 
a community is a very subjective endeavor, and in many ways is in the eye of the beholder. Each 
community will have a unique opinion on the matter, and that opinion will change over time. If 
Porter means community quality, his argument is too similar to the claim that zoning is static for it to 
be included as a separate criteria. If the argument is based more on building quality, this is not a 
reasonable objective of zoning, and is appropriately left to building standards. In either event this 
argument will not be included in this analysis. 
While the three identified flaws are fairly comprehensive, I believe that another needs to be 
included. Several academicians and practitioners argue that conventional zoning inhibits market 
forces to the point of being a detriment. Gordon and Richardson (1993) claim that the appropriate 
method for land use regulation should be “[p]ricing over prohibition” (p352). They remark that many 
in the planning community claim that “since most allocative choices involve a tradeoff between 
efficiency and equity, planners must intervene to achieve an appropriate degree of redistribution... 
[T]he market attends to efficiency, while planners look after equity” (p347). They claim that these 
arguments are based on an exaggerated concern over market failure. They reject the concern that 
planning is the only thing standing in the way of rampant inequity, commenting that while 
regulatory interventions are necessary on occasion, they are used far too often, restraining market 
forces beyond reasonable limits.  
Though Gordon and Richardson underestimate the importance of regulatory intervention, 
particularly for equity and environmental concerns, their argument is a valid one, and has serious 
ramifications for planning. In an attempt to prevent negative externalities, zoning can severely 
hinder market forces. I agree with Gordon and Richardson that there needs to be a planning 
mechanism that allows for a larger market role. Not coincidentally, all three of the zoning 
alternatives to be evaluated have increased development flexibility in an attempt to expand the role 
of the market.  
In sum, three benefits and four flaws of zoning have been identified as reasonable criteria for 
evaluating zoning alternatives. They are: 
 6 
 
 
Benefits 
-  Ensures separation of incompatible uses 
-  Provides security for land developers and 
purchasers 
-  Is compatible with the tenets of good 
planning  
Flaws 
-  It is static 
-  It is parochial instead of regional 
- It creates administrative hassles 
-  It hinders market forces
 
These evaluation criteria will be used to determining the extent to which three of the most 
important and influential alternatives, that of performance zoning, transect planning, and no-zoning, 
improve on conventional zoning. First to performance zoning, one of the earliest zoning alternatives. 
 
The Performance Zoning Alternative 
 
Mid-century, rapidly changing technology forced administrators to reconsider the merits of 
standardized building codes. As materials and techniques improved, the standards would quickly 
become out of date. In 1951, Dennis O’Harrow recommended in a paper given at the ASPO National 
Planning Conference that industrial zoning specify desired performance standards for the following 
fields: 
 
1. Noise 
2. Smoke 
3. Odor 
4. Dust and dirt 
5. Noxious gases 
6. Glare and heat 
7. Fire hazards 
8. Industrial wastes 
9. Transportation and traffic 
10. Aesthetics 
11. Psychological effects 
 
Mr. O’Harrow wrote 
 
If the zoning ordinance is to function as we should like it to function, industries will be judged 
only on the effects they produce, and any industry will be permitted to go into any industrial 
district –including a combined residence-industry district- if it can comply with our standards 
(267).  
 
The first nine of these fields are clearly quantifiable, each with the potential to be measurable in a 
standardized manner. The final two are not as quantifiable and are context dependent. This causes a 
problem for standards compliance, a problem which O’Harrow acknowledged. “Perhaps we can 
assume that the psychological hazards will be present in only the combined residence-industry 
district. For that combined district, we may have to prohibit certain industries by name- which is 
 7 
always bad” (267). Nonetheless, the concept of regulating effects instead of actions was immediately 
popular on several fronts. The performance standards recommended by O’Harrow and his colleagues 
helped promote greater environmental protection while at the same time supporting industrial 
operation. The success of these standards led many communities to implement variations on this 
theme of performance, rather than prescriptive, standards, not just in industrial zoning but in all 
forms of land use zoning.  
The performance zoning method was significantly bolstered with the publication of 
Performance Zoning (Kendig 1980). This was the first comprehensive look at this idea, complete with 
a model ordinance and theoretical argument for performance zoning’s validity. The model ordinance 
established eight zoning district types and nineteen general land uses. Each land use was restricted to 
some subsection of the eight districts in deference to the non-quantifiable aesthetic and psychological 
effects of certain types of development. While this is the kind of restriction that O’Harrow 
admonished, each land use type was permitted far more flexibility in location options than in 
conventional zoning. Finally, each district was given performance standards ranging from regional 
environmental quality to site and building design. Permit approval is then contingent solely on a 
developer’s ability to satisfy the performance standards laid out for that land use in that zoning 
district. The result is a city development process that is more favorable for developers yet yields the 
same end results for the community at large. “The narrowly defined land use district is abandoned in 
favor of districts with distinctly different functions, characters, and purposes; so long as a 
development does not upset the balance struck by these regulations, it is permitted” (p281). While 
Kendig’s model ordinance is informative, it is only idealized. A more worthwhile analysis was 
completed by Douglas Porter (1988), who did a comprehensive analysis of seven communities that 
were using performance zoning. He noted that communities using performance standards shared a 
general interest in promoting land use patterns that minimized public and private development cost, 
allowed for increased market intervention, preserved environmental resources and stimulated high-
quality development. Through his analysis it was found that communities with the most performance 
standards had the largest density impacts, and that they in turn, by effecting increased density, were 
able to lower public infrastructure cost. Additionally, flexibility tempered with some level of 
predictability can lead to development that is congruent with community goals without “result[ing] 
in massive changes in expected uses or numerous encroachments of atypical uses in existing 
neighborhoods” (p79). Finally, evidence was mixed on performance zoning’s ability to affect 
environmental protection. It seems that, much like in conventional zoning, environmental 
conservation is dependent more upon good comprehensive planning than anything else. This makes 
sense, as a routine suitability analysis should point to areas of high conservation value, of which some 
will require strict inflexible regulation to ensure the retention of that value. 
Performance zoning fares well when compared to conventional zoning. It is clearly less static 
a system, though there are practical limits to development flexibility as evidenced by the need to 
incorporate some absolute standards for psychological reasons, and the retention of a rigid zoning 
map. However, these absolute standards help to ensure that incompatible uses are separated. Many of 
the administrative problems of conventional zoning are passed to the developer, who now must make 
a rigorous catalog of adherence to performance standards before permits are granted. It is also argued 
that this encourages innovation in an effort to reduce costs of meeting standards, thus improving 
development quality. In addition, the increased flexibility allows for increased market efficacy. And 
performance zoning is congruent with the principles of good planning.  
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For all of performance zoning’s positives, there are some problematic aspects. One is that the 
new administrative hassles stemming from enacting such a novel regulatory system can cripple it. In 
several cases, communities studied by Porter eventually dropped the performance standards from 
their ordinances. A follow-up article to Porter’s original study found that many of the communities 
had abandoned zoning because “the rationale underlying the performance measures was difficult for 
laypeople, public officials, and even planners to understand and accept” (Porter 1998,  p2), 
reemphasizing the importance of citizen and homeowner security. Another problem comes directly 
from Porter’s original analysis of communities using flexible zoning standards, mentioning that “[t]he 
flexible systems tend to emphasize issues of site design and compatibility between adjacent sites over 
questions involving communitywide land use and development patterns” (Porter 1988, p79). While 
this finding does not find a flaw with the theory of performance zoning, it does point to an inability 
in real world settings to ensure high-quality regional development. I would venture to add that in 
theory too, a more flexible but still bounded set of zoning districts are still as likely to serve parochial 
over regional needs as conventional zoning. In both cases, regional interests are beholden to the 
interests and objectives of local town concerns, regardless of how divergent those concerns may be 
from regional concerns.  In Kendig’s model ordinance, the land use restrictions of the eight zoning 
districts may result in a zoning map in which a regional concern such as affordable housing or 
particular job needs will be underrepresented spatially for the benefit of parochial concerns like an 
increased tax base. This can result in the same inequities as in conventional zoning. 
In sum, performance zoning and performance standards are a step in the right direction in 
several respects. Areas of improvement are the abandonment of the static land use plan, an allowance 
of increased market freedoms, and the potential for improved outcomes while retaining a connection 
to good planning principles. However, the administrative hurdles of this zoning alternative make 
implementation difficult, while at the same time giving the impression to home owners of less 
development certainty. Table 1 below summarizes how Performance Zoning compares to 
conventional zoning on all seven of the evaluation criteria. 
 
Table 1 Performance Zoning Evaluation Summary 
Performance Zoning 
Evaluation Criteria Change Comments 
Benefits 
 Separates incompatible land      
uses 
Unchanged Absolute criteria ensures separation of 
incompatible uses but at the cost of  flexibility 
 Provides security Worsened Practical hurdles of gaining citizen trust seem too 
much to handle 
 Connection with good 
planning 
Slightly 
improved 
Increased weight for economic concerns; 
environment and equity are still beholden to the 
rest of the comprehensive planning process 
Flaws 
 Static land use plan Improved While zoning maps remain, flexibility is greatly 
increased on a parcel level 
 Parochial instead of regional Unchanged Parochial concerns are still evident in 
performance zoning maps and regulations 
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 Administrative problems Unchanged/ 
Worsened 
New administrative problems substitute for old 
ones 
 Limited market freedom Improved More land use options allow developers more 
freedoms, of which they seem to take advantage  
 
As can be seen, there is room for improvement. One method of improvement may be an 
increased focus on environmental protection. To that end, transect planning attempts to incorporate 
some of the aspects of performance zoning within a context of strong environmental protection, and 
will be discussed in full in the following section. 
 
SmartCode – The Transect Alternative 
 
One of the more vociferous complaints against conventional zoning is its inability to recreate 
the community-oriented village so common to earlier generations. The memories of a viable 
downtown Main St., a mix of residential, commercial and civic uses, and the inherent walkability of 
America’s earliest towns is still a happy – if perhaps atavistic – one. The last decade has seen a sharp 
increase in the demand for that style of living (though the total demand is still small), and New 
Urbanism has responded with great success. New Urbanist communities are extremely popular, and 
the higher densities can therefore lead to higher profits for those developers patient enough to see 
them into fruition. That patience is borne from the conflict between conventional zoning and the 
denser, mixed-use style needed for New Urbanist communities. Nearly every New Urbanist project 
requires rezoning, adding time and money to a development approval processes that can often be 
overwhelming for even the simplest new developments. As a result, a call has gone out for a zoning 
alternative that can handle the needs of these new communities. One of New Urbanisms founders, 
Andres Duany, has spearheaded the creation of just such an alternative, that of the Transect.  
The Transect, in Duany and Talen’s (2002) words,  
 
is a geographical cross-section of a region used to reveal a sequence of environments. For human 
environments, this cross-section can be used to identify a set of habitats that vary by their level and 
intensity of urban character, a continuum that ranges from rural to urban. In transect planning, this 
range of environments is the basis for organizing the components of the built world: building, lot, land 
use, street, and all of the other physical elements of the human habitat. (p246) 
 
The important point in this definition is the idea of ranges of intensity of urban character. In 
some sense, this could also be labeled the density of the built landscape. Duany and Talen identify six 
categories of development intensity. They are, from least intense to most intense, Rural Preserve, 
Rural Reserve, Sub-Urban, General Urban, Urban Center, Urban Corei. Each type of intensity has its 
own characteristics, including its own unique range of ecological needs. Areas that would be 
designated as Rural Reserve, like farmland or wooded areas, only function effectively when there are 
low levels of development and large amounts of open green space. Conversely, an Urban Center 
needs high levels of human development and limited amounts of open space to function. It is within 
                                                 
i Some types of development, like landfills and airports, are recognized as not fitting in any of these zones, and 
hence a separate special district has been created for them.  
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this construct of the disparate ecological needs of various human landscapes that Transect Planning 
operates.  
 As each category of development (or “ecozones” as they are labeled) has its own ecological 
needs, so does each require unique varieties and intensities of land use designed to promote those 
ecological needs. This need cannot be accomplished without taking into account the zone’s 
relationship with its neighbors. The ability of each ecozone to successfully function is dependent on 
the character of neighboring ecozones. Areas of Rural Preserve immediately adjacent to Urban 
Centers will be less effective than ones adjacent to Rural Reserve. As is seen in Figure 1 below, the 
landscape seamlessly flows from one ecozone to another, creating a region that is highly effective and 
highly receptive to the environmental and human needs of the area. 
 
Figure 1 - Ideal transition from rural to urbanii 
 
taken from ‘SmartCode’, Duany Plater-Zybek.  
 
                                                 
ii The names of ecozones in this figure are not consistent with earlier writings by Duany and Talen, but zones 
T1-T6 in the figure are identical to the six categories of development intensity mentioned earlier. 
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 In the world of transect planning, gone is the parcel-by-parcel designation of use. In its stead, the 
parcel’s designation as part of one of the six ecozones determines its potential use. Each parcel can be 
used for a larger variety of development, but under the regulations of that ecozone. The ecozone 
regulation is spelled out in the SmartCode, a model unified development ordinance created by the 
same authors.  
The SmartCode offers development regulation on three scales, the region (called ‘sector’), the 
neighborhood (or ‘community’) and individual buildings. Each scale has its own plan. The Sector Plan 
should aim to retain the natural infrastructure and character of the region as derived from various 
environmental indicators like topography, soils and riparian features. The Community Plan should 
aim to create neighborhoods where single use districts are the exception rather than the norm. 
Neighborhoods in the SmartCode have clear town centers that allow the daily activities of its 
residents to occur in a pedestrian-accessible manner. The Block and Building Plan is concerned 
primarily with creating a sense of place. This is done through providing multi-modal accessibility, 
reserving important sites for civic and public buildings, and by ensuring that architecture is 
consistent with local conditions.  
Transect Planning and the SmartCode is in many ways a sound alternative to conventional 
zoning, responding well to the increased desire for a sense of place. Its environmental sensitivity is 
clear, as its tight connection with ecological terminology suggests. It places an emphasis on regional 
rather than parochial concerns, and claims to be more developer-friendly than conventional zoning 
without allowing incompatible uses to neighbor each other. For these reasons and more, communities 
have begun to adopt the SmartCode, or variations of it, with success. Those communities concerned 
with the sprawling suburbia emblematic of so many cities across America can find in the Transect a 
viable alternative. The fact that communities are adopting these ideas suggests that homeowners do 
not feel that their investments are threatened. Replacing conventional zoning with the six-tiered 
ecozone system seems a logical, and perhaps superior, way to manage responsible growth. In sum, 
this is an excellent normative system.  
There are issues however. As the authors admit, transect planning and conventional zoning 
are not reconcilable. They caution that any merger of the two would likely result in the continuation 
of existing urban patterns, thus counteracting the very purpose of transect planning. Another concern 
noted by the authors stems from the intent of transect itself, namely a complete change from current 
zoning practice. The political difficulty in abandoning an already entrenched form of land use control 
is significant. The authors suggest that transect “be cast as an extension of consumer choice” (Duany 
and Talen, p262) in an attempt to create the political capital to make such significant changes, though 
it is unclear exactly how the authors expect this political capital to be gained. They also suggest that 
the SmartCode may have to be originally installed as an optional regulatory system in an effort to give 
evidence of that consumer choice mentioned above, which can add significant administrative costs.  
I have three other criticisms. The first deals with the degree of development regulation in the 
SmartCode. Regulations like setbacks and building heights contribute significantly to a sense of place 
and beauty so lacking in the modern subdivision, but they hardly seem necessary components of 
successful cities. These kinds of heavy-handed regulations have historically come under attack. Even 
America’s foremost planner and architect, Thomas Jefferson, had the following to say on the subject: 
 
 I doubt very much whether the obligation to build the houses at a given distance from the street, 
contributes to its beauty, it produces a disgusting monotony, all persons make this complaint against 
 12 
Philadelphia, the contrary practice varies the appearance and is much more convenient to the 
inhabitants (Reps 1967, 4) 
 
In this way, the SmartCode is very similar to existing development regulation; its ability to satisfy the 
goals of the citizenry is in large measure determined by the tastes of those citizens. While some will 
enjoy the finished product of SmartCode regulation, others will find it monotonous, sterile or phony. 
This is not to say that these people are correct. Rather, it is of no consequence whether they are 
correct or not. All that matters is that there is certain to be difference of opinion on the relative 
success of the attempt at place-making. In combination with the ingrained resistance to 
governmental regulation, the SmartCode may be its own worst enemy in its aim to create healthier 
living environments.  
My second criticism relates to the concept of market flexibility and development freedom. 
While the elimination of conventional zoning will certainly allow for increased development 
flexibility, without ecozone flexibility there is a significant development inhibition. Rigid 
development zones will always conflict with market freedoms, ecozones not excepted.  Inhibition 
will be less than in conventional zoning, but developers may still feel that their goals can be achieved 
by circumventing the planning process, using political and administrative leverage to gain variances 
for their projects, and thus eroding the intent –particularly the ecological intent- of the transect 
planning process.   
Hand in hand with the concerns of political leverage is the concern about those hardest hit by 
the development changes resulting from that leverage, the underrepresented groups most likely to 
bear the burden of development variances, often the poor. Any zoning alternative should in some 
measure address this issue. As equity is one of the key aspects of good planning, it is just as important 
that zoning alternatives solve inequities as solving environmental degradation. While the process of 
Transect Planning, with its ecologically distinct ecozones, increases positive environmental outcomes, 
no similar process ensures human equity. While ecozones encourage a mix of housing types and 
prices, this mix is not guaranteed like ecological protection is. This to me is an unfortunate flaw of 
this alternative. The strength of this alternative is the preeminent role of the natural environment. 
Without similar equity measures, transect planning may be at risk of producing suboptimal outcomes.  
In general, transect planning seems to improve on conventional zoning. Ecozones based on 
regional ecological conditions ensure that parochial interests do not overpower regional ones. The 
increased weight on ecology, along with increased development flexibility within ecozones allows for 
the possibility of higher-orders planning outcomes. And each ecozone allows for separation of 
incompatible land uses, but may even improve upon conventional zoning’s separations by creating a 
systematic method for land use exclusions.  
Despite these improvements, there are still flaws. New administrative problems substitute for 
old ones; tight restrictions on construction are not necessary for improved ecological outcomes but 
may be found too restrictive by developers who would otherwise be amenable to transect principles; 
and the land use plan is still static even if more land use options are available to developers. Table 2 
below compares transect planning to conventional planning and zoning. 
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Table 2 Evaluation Summary 
Transect Planning 
Evaluation Criteria Change Comments 
Benefits 
Separates incompatible land 
uses 
Improved Ecological framework used to separate 
incompatible uses is more robust 
Provides security Unchanged? Adoption of SmartCode may mean that 
homeowner security is retained, but this is 
still unclear 
Connection with good 
planning 
Slightly 
improved 
Increased weight for environmental concerns, 
potential increases for economy or equity 
Flaws 
Static land use plan Unchanged There is still little room for alterations once 
plan is formalized 
Parochial instead of regional Improved Ecozones are often based on regional 
environmental quality conditions 
Administrative problems Unchanged New administrative problems substitute for 
old ones 
Limited market freedom Unchanged More land use options, fewer construction 
options 
 
Interestingly, the transect method seems to improve on economic and ecologic outcomes 
despite the commonly cited tension between the two (Kaiser et al 1995). This tension exists not only 
for economy and ecology, but as well for economy and equity. New highways meant to spur growth 
destroy existing working class neighborhoods. New shopping malls make poor adjacent subdivisions 
unlivable. New jobs are recruited, but are allowed to settle far from the public transportation so vital 
to the job prospects of car-less citizens. In all these instances, equity is sacrificed for the sake of 
economics. And just as often, regulations meant to serve the underrepresented are cast as inhibiting 
economic freedom. Some believe that this relationship is not reciprocal. Rather, they argue that 
regulation inhibits the ability of communities to reach positive economic solutions, thus limiting 
equity and environmental opportunities. Were regulation curtailed, so too would these issues. Some 
communities are beginning to experiment with just such a zoning alternative, that of no zoning. In 
the following section, the no-zoning system, particularly its use in Houston, will be analyzed in 
detail. 
 
Houston – The No Zoning Alternative 
 
Zoning as a regulatory system is premised upon the understanding that land use patterns can 
affect public health, safety and welfare. Residential dwellings near onerous industrial plants or school 
buildings near natural or man-made hazards are just two such examples of the relationship between 
land use and the public interest. It is undeniable that some regulatory mechanism is needed to 
maintain this public interest. However, some communities feel that zoning’s top-down regulation is 
too restrictive and thus unnecessary, and have abandoned conventional zoning entirely. In its stead a 
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new regulatory system has arisen; the private deed restriction. Individual communities, 
neighborhoods or landowners place covenants on land parcels whereby the use of the land is 
restricted to those uses outlined in the covenant, under penalty of foreclosure. In this way, land use 
issues can be agreed upon with little governmental interference apart from constitutionally protected 
rights of real property ownership. Common elements of these covenants include height requirements, 
design standards and building setbacks. These covenants are passed from owner to owner and are 
extremely difficult to overturn, sometimes requiring 100% approval amongst relevant parties to undo. 
The result of the system is a considerable amount of land use freedom. 
Several cities are using no-zoning alternatives. Houston, Texas is one such city, and is 
America’s largest city not to have any comprehensive zoning ordinance. Houston has over 2 million 
residents spread throughout 633 square milesiii, resulting in a population density of 3,160 people per 
mile (a number consistent with other large Sunbelt cities). Though Houston has no zoning, there are 
some land use restrictions; they are merely few and very specific. There are sign restrictions, parking 
requirements and controls on the location of businesses that may grossly impinge on the safety and 
welfare of the citizens, such as sex businesses and industrial plants (note the similarity of the latter 
restrictions to the absolute standards of performance zoning). In addition, all new subdivisions must 
meet building standards laid out in Chapter 42 of the city’s Code of Ordinances, most of which are 
concerned with street and building design. Because of the relatively limited restrictions and the 
wealth of analyzable information about the city, Houston will be used as a no-zoning case study. 
Before turning to Houston, it is worth considering the regulatory system’s theoretical benefits 
and concerns. The primary benefit is certain to be increased economic freedom. One can expect that 
regulatory relaxations should encourage significant development, though it is uncertain how 
development will be spatially situated. The major concern of no-zoning is a loss of environment and 
equity protection. Private deed restrictions written by individuals or small groups of neighbors are 
less likely to be concerned with communitywide issues of environmental protection and equitable 
housing practices. As a result, growth may encroach onto environmentally sensitive lands, leading to 
adverse effects on both human and wildlife habitats; as well a surfeit of large lot homebuilding may 
lead to an underrepresentation of affordable housing. The loss of these protections may in turn 
increase sprawl and speed the dissolution of downtown, two outcomes usually curtailed by 
environment and equity protection. Part of the critique of the no-zoning alternative should be an 
examination of the extent to which these theoretical concerns are manifest in practice. 
At least one of these concerns may be unfounded. An interesting aspect of Houston’s no-
zoning system is the limited effect that it seems to have on city form. Neumann points out that 
Houston looks very similar to zoned communities. Additionally, there is a burgeoning downtown and 
a legible mix of uses in the urban core. While Neumann suggests that this calls into question the role 
of conventional zoning as a major determinant of city form, and claims that spatial patterns such as 
the one exhibited in Houston are simply the reflection of market demand, I contend that the 
similarity in city form is just as likely the result of the private deed restrictions. These deeds should 
reveal the same city form as would conventional zoning, as the exclusion of incompatible land uses is 
at the center of both regulatory devices. Were Houston and similar communities to have no land 
restrictions whatsoever and still find no alteration to city form, Neumann’s contention would be 
                                                 
iii from City of Houston Planning and Development Dept. 2003 
http://www.ci.houston.tx.us/departme/planning/planning_dev_web/long_range/demographics/Ann_%20Est_City.htm 
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more valid. Regardless, the land use similarity may assuage some of the previously expressed concerns 
about no-zoning.    
Unfortunately, other findings seem to point to the possibility that those concerns are 
reasonable. Weintraub (1994) notes that six of the eight incinerators in Houston are in predominantly 
African-American neighborhoods, this in a city that was reported as 25% black or African-American 
in the 2000 Census, with very few predominantly black neighborhoods, as is seen in Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2   Racial Mix in Houston PMSA 
 
 
Also, while 64% of housing stock in Houston is affordable for median income households, higher 
than the national average of 62%, it is lower than cities with comparable size and density like 
Phoenix, Dallas and San Antonioiv.  
In addition, environmental deficiencies abound. In 2001, Houston was named most congested 
city by the Texas Transportation Institute. The year before, Houston was cited as having the most 
ozone-polluted air in the country (Neumann 2003). Unregulated growth spills into the floodplains, 
and is constantly susceptible to flooding. The Harris County Flood Control District estimates a major 
flood in the area occurs every two years. These floods, in addition to the obvious environmental 
damage, have nationwide economic effects, as more federal flood insurance claims have been paid to 
the county than any other contributing county in Americav.  
While these findings are not exclusively related to a lack of zoning, they are interesting. No 
conclusions can be drawn from these observations, but it may be worth examining other 
                                                 
iv Taken from “Affordable Housing: A Foundation for Stable Communities” East-West Gateway Coordinating 
Council.  http://www.ewgateway.org/pdffiles/library/housing/affordablehsg.pdf 
v Taken from Harris County Flood Control District website. http://www.hcfcd.org/hcfloodhistory.html 
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communities that lack zoning to see if similar effects are seen. Regardless, the findings are interesting 
if only for the fact that they are the exact kinds of suboptimal outcomes that good planning can avoid. 
Perhaps these are indicators of the inadequacies of the no-zoning system. In Houston and other no-
zoning cities there is no method for protecting environmentally sensitive areas, and no way for the 
government to change allowed land uses to encourage beneficial growth patterns. Without effective 
regulations to ensure strong equity and environment, the long-term benefits of the economic 
freedoms created by the no-zoning strategy seem less worthwhile. While the no zoning alternative 
allows for increased market freedoms, balanced regional approaches to planning can easily be 
discarded when regulation is handled through private deed restriction, and the connection with good 
planning principles is in many ways abandoned for the sake of these market freedoms. In this system, 
development regulation is relaxed while regional and social agendas are relegated to inferior roles. 
Parochial-minded protection for those already living in the city and those with the ability to control 
the actions of their neighbors takes precedent, particularly for wealthier citizens and others that are 
able to wield the necessary influence to ensure that their interests are not impinged. In some sense, 
equity and environment have been sacrificed for the sake of economy. The thing that is most 
distressing about the system of deed restrictions is that there is in fact little gain in land use freedoms 
though it comes at the expense of serious inequity. Instead of governmental restriction on 
development, there is neighborhood restriction on development that strangely is monitored and 
enforced by a government who has little say in the regulations they enforce. While outcomes in this 
system can be beneficial to neighborhoods, they can just as easily be antithetical to citywide 
outcomes, and there is little that can be done to correct this problem. 
In sum, Houston’s system has some positives, particularly for economic development, but the 
negatives such as inadequate environment and equity protection, far outweigh them. This is reflected 
in Table 3. The goal of planning is and should be the harmonious balance of economy, equity and 
environment. Houston’s no-zoning policy is destined to fail in this regard, and consequently cannot 
be recommended as a real improvement over conventional zoning.  
 
Table 3 Evaluation Summary 
No zoning 
Evaluation Criteria Change Comments 
Benefits 
Separates incompatible land 
uses 
Unchanged This is dependent on deed restrictions, but it is 
assumed that incompatible uses are almost 
always disallowed by deed 
Provides security Improved It is more difficult to undo a deed restriction 
than to rezone 
Connection with good 
planning 
Worsened No equity or environmental regulations to 
speak of is a major concern 
Flaws 
Static land use plan Improved No restrictive zoning map 
Parochial instead of regional Worsened Instead of being merely parochial, this system 
excludes on a neighborhood scale 
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Administrative problems Worsened Enforcement of deed restrictions can be 
cumbersome and require far too much 
administrative intervention 
Limited market freedom Slightly 
improved 
More land use options, but also more site by 
site restrictions 
 
Review of Evaluations 
   
The evaluation of prominent zoning alternatives has shed new light on how best to update 
zoning, and put to rest some issues about the relevance of particular alternate methods. Each of the 
alternatives discussed has its share of worthwhile lessons. Performance zoning has the benefit of 
concerning itself with goal fulfillment rather than policy fulfillment. Transect planning expands the 
possibilities for zoning by taking an ecological approach to determining land development. The 
absence of zoning signals the potential for increased freedom in development decisions, and the 
realization that conventional zoning may have little effect on built form. However, there are also 
clear problems that emerge. No alternative has been able to overcome the administrative hassles of 
land use regulation. And market freedoms have limits set either by planners or by deed holders.  A 
summary of each alternative is provided in Table 4.  
 
Table 4  Summary Table 
 Zoning Alternatives 
Evaluation Criteria Performance Zoning Transect Planning No zoning 
Benefits 
Separates 
incompatible land uses 
Unchanged Improved Unchanged 
Provides security Worsened Unchanged? Improved 
Connection with good 
planning 
Slightly improved Slightly improved Worsened 
Flaws 
Static land use plan Improved Unchanged Improved 
Parochial instead of 
regional 
Unchanged Improved Worsened 
Administrative 
problems 
Unchanged/ 
Worsened 
Unchanged Worsened 
Limited market 
freedom 
Improved Unchanged Slightly improved 
 
What is needed is a system that can incorporate the lessons learned from this evaluation 
while being a natural extension of good comprehensive planning. The key lessons can be summarized 
as: 
- Allowing flexibility in land use development adds considerably to an increased market role, is 
more responsive to changing city conditions, and creates less static land use plans; though 
abandoning regulation entirely can be disastrous to environment and equity concerns.  
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- Regional concerns are better met when regional issues play a prominent role in determining 
land use designation.  
- Administrative hassles are almost certain to be present in any regulatory system, regardless of 
attempts to minimize them, and as such may not be a major concern in determining zoning 
alternative efficacy.  
- Zoning alternatives can still have a connection to good planning. 
 
In light of these points, the next section outlines a new alternative that incorporates these 
components of the evaluated alternatives while improving on their deficiencies. 
 
SECTION III: The Sustainable Development Deviation Method 
 
In the following section the rationale behind a new zoning, and in some ways planning, 
alternative that I call the Sustainable Development Deviation (SDD) method is outlined. It 
incorporates the lessons learned from current alternatives yet stakes new ground in an effort to 
change not only the way that planning is accomplished, but how planning interacts with a market-
driven economic system. Theoretically, this method should be incorporated with conventional 
zoning or with zoning alternatives, requiring only sound comprehensive planning for full 
functionality. Practically, this method’s rationale may help planners better understand and facilitate 
economic growth without sacrificing other planning goals.  
The SDD method stems from the lessons learned from zoning alternatives evaluated in 
Section II. However, there are some aspects that are based on issues not previously discussed. In 
particular, a significant portion of the SDD rationale rests on the premise that there is a key problem 
in the comprehensive planning process, one that is hindering the potential of land regulation 
outcomes. That problem is the reliance on often unreliable economic projections, and the impacts 
that those projections have on policy making. Before turning to the SDD method, this problem is 
examined in detail. 
 
The Problem with Good Planning 
 
A major source of influence in the study of land use planning is Kaiser, Godschalk and 
Chapin’s Urban Land Use Planning, a rigorous methodology of good comprehensive planning. They 
argue that an overarching goal of good comprehensive planning should be to incorporate the wants 
and needs of citizens in a sustainable manner so as to create a community that maximizes citizen –
both current and future- benefit. They argue that the fulcrum around which such good and 
sustainable planning balances is the triangle of economy, equity and ecology. It is through the 
balance of these three elements that planners can achieve healthy and sustainable communities. 
Through the years, this idea - and the methods espoused by the authors for its successful achievement 
- has guided countless community planning processes. A critical component of their suggested 
methodology is the creation and application of a community fact base. The fact base contains 
information about existing economic, demographic and environmental conditions, as well as 
projections for future growth and change. It is the backbone of good comprehensive planning. All 
determinations for land development and regulation stem in some measure from the fact base. 
Therefore, all planning outcomes stem in some measure from the fact base. 
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Without question, application of a fact base can lead to highly successful planning outcomes. 
The process adds an element of scientific rigor that would otherwise hinder planning efforts. There is 
a catch though, and that catch is the potential inaccuracy of future projections. Previous research in 
the field points to an inherent difficulty in accurate predictions of future events, particularly those 
affecting the economy (Heyman 1970). Given projections’ prominent role in shaping future form, 
there is always the possibility that an otherwise sound comprehensive planning process will lead to 
suboptimal outcomes. Frequent updates to the plan can help minimize this suboptimization, but the 
updates are equally likely to be flawed. This is a serious dilemma for the economic branch of 
comprehensive planning.  
The inability to accurately project future economic optimality signals the potential for better 
methods of determining economy-related planning actions. Clearly, attempting to predetermine 
future conditions is flawed. Perhaps to ensure fully optimal planning outcomes, market-driven 
deviations from the comprehensive plan should be allowed. Gordon and Richardson and their 
colleagues espouse this idea, suggesting that planners allow developers an opportunity to capitalize on 
market changes without requiring rezoning or plan updates. However, these market-driven 
deviations have effects on other community concerns. Market-based land use changes will have 
environmental and equity impacts; for example, new office buildings increase the need for new 
homes and increase impervious surface runoff and total vehicle emission. This is not surprising, since 
economic decisions are dependent on such variables as population and job growth, real estate values 
or other market indicators, while environmental and equity indicators are not. 
 Unfortunately, economic improvement can come at the expense of ecology and equity. In 
such a situation, an optimal outcome is still not achieved, but certain economic benefit may very well 
outweigh potential environmental and equity detriment and lead to a higher overall outcome. Coase 
(1960) argues that attaining a better outcome is worth the price. “The question is commonly thought 
of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But 
this is wrong…The real question is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm 
A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm” (p2). This argument seems flawed. In such 
instances it is unreasonable to expect one group to reap full profit when there is a cost to other 
parties. Inequities occur when some group does not have to pay the full cost of their actions. A 
developer should not be allowed to deviate from the comprehensive plan just because there is better 
profit to be made, particularly when that profit comes at the expense of the environment and equity. 
However, were a developer forced to compensate for damages incurred by that deviation to the point 
where there would be no loss in environmental or equity outcomes, there would still be the potential 
for increases (albeit smaller) in economic outcomes. In this case, everyone either improves or remains 
the same, increasing total outcome without any groups sacrificing. This is a better solution to the 
problem than the one posed by Coase. Instead of a winner and a loser, there is a winner and a party 
that comes out even. This solution would be ideal for planners. A more optimal outcome is reached 
while a sustainable balance is still achieved.  
 Planning efforts aimed at protecting environment and equity are routine. Attempting such 
protection within the context of increased market freedoms is not. However, such actions are 
congruent with economic arguments about planning. Terry Moore (1978) argues that planners are 
justified in taking protective actions because of economic theories of public goods. Public goods are 
defined as those goods which are nonexclusive and nonrival. Planners should intervene in the 
provision of public goods when “the cost of intervening in the market system [is] outweighed by the 
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benefits of improvement in efficiency or equity” (p393-4). In agreement are Richardson and Gordon 
(1993), who argue that the planner’s role should not be one of regulation but of creation and 
enforcement of market-based externality correction. As these externalities appear most often in 
environmental and equity regulation – or in a sense, public goods – planning intervention is 
appropriate. In addition to the economic justification posed above, I theorize that it is reasonable for 
planners to focus on public goods because equity and environmental outcomes are not so easily 
swayed by changing future projections, and thus are more likely to be optimized by principles of 
good comprehensive planning. It is then reasonable to assume that a planning method that allowed 
for increased economic freedoms while maintaining equity and ecology outcomes would be more 
amenable to economists and developers, would complement good planning principles without relying 
on uncertain economic projections, and would still allow planners to act on behalf of the public 
interest. What is needed then is a method that actually accomplishes this. Such a method, the 
Sustainable Development Deviation Method, is explained next.  
 
Sustainable Development Deviations 
 
 In order to ensure a scenario that allows for deviations without losing parties, I suggest that 
there be environment and equity linkage fees on deviations from the proposed land use plan, a 
method I am calling Sustainable Development Deviations. These fees would allow developers more 
freedom to respond to changing market conditions while raising monies that are specifically targeted 
to ensure that optimal sustainable ecology and equity outcomes (i.e. outcomes for Moore’s public 
goods) still occur. In this system, everything about the currently accepted comprehensive planning 
process remains the same, except for the understanding that land use maps are optimal only if future 
projections are 100% accurate. As future conditions deviate from future projections, developers are 
allowed to find more economically optimal land use patterns, but are forced to pay for these 
deviations through linkage fees that price the resultant environmental and equity deviations. These 
fees are then used to mitigate that deviation, ensuring environmental and equity-related objectives 
and policies are still carried out in full. 
 This system solves most all of the flaws of conventional zoning. First, it has a dynamic land 
use plan by definition. Second, it is regional rather than parochial, as regional economic trends will 
hold sway in the face of parochial land use preferences (and most importantly, parochial land use 
exclusions like large lot zoning). Occasions where parochial concerns would outweigh regional 
concerns would stem from environmental or equity restrictions, like development restrictions on 
large areas of environmentally sensitive lands, or a severe lack of affordable housing, and as such 
would be reasonable. Third, while administrative problems may arise due to complications in 
monitoring and implementation, there is no inequity in administrative processes and the difficulties 
arising from rezoning and variance decisions would be eliminated. Fourth, market freedoms are 
significantly enhanced. And finally, the rationale for this alternative is inextricably tied to the tenets 
of good planning, particularly the balance of economy, equity and environment. Equity and 
environmental concerns are pushed to the forefront of the city development process, receiving the 
attention that they need for successful attainment of sound planning outcomes. In addition, the 
lessons gleaned from the zoning alternatives are applied, especially increased development flexibility 
and increased weight on regional issues.   
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 What is needed for this system to work is a pricing system for different environmental and 
equity variables. The next section looks briefly at the rationale for using linkage fees instead of impact 
fees before turning finally to a stylized description of how the SDD method would operate. 
 
Impact Fees vs. Linkage Fees 
 
 Impact fees are “charges levied against new development in order to generate revenue for 
funding capital improvements necessitated by that development” (National Assc. of Developers 1984). 
Impact fees can be used to fund on- or off-site facility construction that mitigates the cost of 
providing service to new development without having to issue bonds or increase tax loads on existing 
residents. As impact fees increase the cost of development, some have argued that inequities are 
created. The increased costs lead to increased housing prices, effectively pricing out the poorest 
residents and counteracting affordable housing goals. This problem is compounded because impact 
fees are often assessed based on number of bedrooms, increasing the price of multi-family home 
construction (Morgan 1988). As a result, it has been argued that impact fees make for bad planning, as 
they emphasize short-term fiscal solvency over long-term social goals (Connerly 1988). 
 These are valid complaints. While the rapid pace of growth, particularly in suburban areas, 
can create financial problems for communities, rectifying this problem only exacerbates equity 
problems. Again we see the tug of war between economy and equity. With impact fees, as it is with 
so many other cases, economic changes hit hardest the poor. So despite the promise that impact fees 
have for mitigating the ill-effects of new development, they are not suitable for the Sustainable 
Development Deviation method. 
 While impact fees have seen widespread acceptance as a means to lessen the fiscal burden of 
new development, a similar concept, that of the linkage fee, has been mainly overlooked as a means 
to lessen social burdens. Linkage fees are levied against developers in an attempt to preserve some 
socially beneficial attribute. As early as 1988, communities were assessing environmental linkage fees, 
whose funds would go towards preserving a cherished natural resource. Riverside, CA used such a 
linkage fee to purchase an 85,000 acre habitat for the Stephens kangaroo rat (Nelson 1992). What 
makes the idea of the linkage fee unique is that it assessed only on developers who build in areas 
where some environmental damage (but not enough damage to warrant development prohibition) 
will occur. The linkage fees are used to purchase lands in the environmentally sensitive areas, thus 
saving some portion. In the place of piecemeal on-site mitigation, this system allows for large 
contiguous tracts to be saved, in line with views on best conservation practices.  
 Linkage fees are also in line with views about Smart Growth. In Florida, linkage fees were 
collected from nonresidential and residential development and placed in a trust fund for use by 
affordable housing developers (Ross 2000).  Taking a slightly different angle, San Francisco’s linkage 
program in the mid-eighties required commercial developers to provide affordable housing for their 
working class employees before permits would be given (Keating 1986). Because of the competitive 
nature of the commercial market, this system worked with significant success. However, it would not 
work as well in communities with less competitive markets. A study done in Philadelphia showed 
that linkage fees were slowing commercial development due to the high mobility of local office 
workers (Huffman and Smith 1988). Without a high demand for downtown office space, developers 
were seeing reduced profit margins and were less interested in building downtown, instead looking to 
the suburbs for available land.  
 22 
 The linkage fees for environment and equity would operate in a very similar way to past 
attempts at linkage fees. The critical difference is that previous attempts at implementation were 
additional fees on developers, and therefore led to inequities, not to mention political unpopularity. 
The SDD method allows developers a choice; either they can follow the recommended land use for 
the area, whereby a sustainable outcome should result, or they can deviate from the recommended 
plan at the price of remuneration that ensures a new, but still sustainable outcome, occurs. If a 
developer feels that there is more economic gain to be had from deviation, they are free to pursue it. 
Planners can still help to ensure that an optimal mix of economic, environmental and equity goals are 
met. In this way, developers and planners are both able to achieve their goals without conflict.  
 
A Stylized Pricing Scheme 
 
 In order for this method to work, there needs to be some pricing scheme that calculates the 
true cost of development deviation. Cost-benefit literature on environmental pricing is robust and 
can be used as a valuable source for environmental cost derivation, but will not be discussed here. 
The literature on affordable housing linkage should provide some information on appropriate fees. 
However, determining the best pricing scheme is beyond the scope of this project (and this author). 
While determination of appropriate pricing schemes may be seen as a significant hurdle to the 
efficacy of the proposed alternative, Richardson and Gordon (1993) claim, “[s]upport for a pricing 
approach is not based on its accurately representing a theoretical distribution of optimal prices, but 
on its superiority to alternative approaches… The goal is policy effectiveness not theoretical 
perfection” (p 347), and I will take that argument as reason enough to continue without a formalized 
best pricing scheme.  
 What I have done in its stead is to create a stylized scenario that may help shed light on the 
kinds of linkage fees that I propose.   
 
 Imagine a community with a planning goal of providing a fair share of affordable housing. 
The accompanying objective is having 10% of all new housing built over the course of the planning 
horizon as affordable housing. Within the definition of “affordable housing” lies a monetary value 
(like mortgages no higher than 30% of the median income of the community, which means 
mortgages on homes valued at $100,000)vi that can aid in an equity linkage fee.  
 Now imagine a developer who wishes to build a new 10 unit high-end subdivision with 
homes worth around $150,000. It is possible, even likely, that this developer does not want to build 
the required one affordable house in this subdivision, citing three reasons; one, because of the loss of 
profit margin on the affordable home; two, because of the loss of profit margin on adjacent homes 
whose sale prices would be higher if a more expensive house was in place of the required affordable 
one; three, because the developer cites previous exclusive subdivisions as proof that building such 
subdivisions is just “giving people what they want”. While the rationale for these arguments may be 
flawed, they are certainly popular opinion and are likely to be voiced. One voice missing in this 
discussion, however, is the group purchasing affordable housing. From their perspective, the loss of 
                                                 
vi Remember, this is just a stylized example and in no way reflects real-world dollar values. The values are 
chosen simply to make the example easier to follow.  
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the affordable home in that subdivision has some monetary value because the supply of affordable 
homes decreases while demand stays the same, effectively increasing affordable housing prices.  
A linkage fee could satisfy both sides’ concerns. Here are two potential methods. 
  
Method 1: Building all 10 homes at $150,000 instead of $100,000 means the stock of affordable, or 
$100,000, homes is reduced. The next level of affordable homes in the city is $101,000. The developer 
should pay a fee that in effect makes $101,000 as affordable as $100,000. One way to do this would be 
to subsidize the increased mortgage payment resulting from the increased sale price. Using reasonable 
assumptions about loan termsvii, additional mortgage payments on the $101,000 house would come to 
$6 per month. Average occupancy in the area is 5 yrs. so each home that is $150,000 instead of 
$100,000 (i.e. unaffordable instead of affordable) costs $6 per month for 60 months, or $360 in linkage 
fees.   
 
Biggest positive: Satisfies all developer concerns, and is cheapest alternative for the 
developer. 
Biggest concern: Developers may decide to build all big houses to maximize profits, 
which can lead to inequitable exclusionary housing practices and a general increase in 
the price of homes.  
   
Method 2: The profit made by developers comes not only from the increased profit margin on the 
now-unaffordable house, but in the increased property values of the other homes. As was mentioned 
previously, a more expensive house raises adjacent property value and therefore the selling price for 
the developer. In this method, the developer builds a $150,000 home instead of a $100,000, and is 
therefore required to pay the increased mortgage costs stemming from the $50,000 price increase, 
which will significantly raise SDD fees.  
 
Biggest positive: Still allows for the possibility of increased profit margins on adjacent 
homes. Encourages developers to build some affordable housing because the profit 
gained from deviations on affordable housing requirements is so small. This allows for 
the possibility of increased housing diversity in new neighborhoods.  
Biggest concern: More expensive for the developer than method 1.  
 
 In each of these methods, developers are allowed the opportunity to decide for themselves 
the optimal economic outcome, but are forced to ensure that equity outcomes are unchanged. While 
the balance between economy and equity is different in the two methods, both may be seen as valid 
means for good planning ends. Neither is likely to be an optimal pricing scheme, but they may help 
to correct inefficiencies found in conventional zoning. Linkage fees of this sort can relate to any 
number of environment and equity issues. It would be up to the community to determine the ones 
most appropriate to them, and that decision should be based in large part on the community goals 
identified in the comprehensive plan. Additionally, this method can operate in communities that are 
using conventional zoning, performance zoning, transect zoning or any other form of land use 
regulation. In this alternative the answer to creating good city form is not in the determination of 
                                                 
vii Assuming a 10% down payment and a 30-year loan with 7% interest rate 
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transect versus conventional zoning, rather it is transect or conventional zoning. The method by 
which a community determines its optimal form is of no consequence to the efficacy of this system. 
All that matters is an ability to adapt to changing market conditions while protecting against 
inequities in public and social goods.  
 
Concerns 
 
 Two main concerns arise from this new method. One is that there is no mechanism for 
ensuring homeowner security or abating citizen reticence about the uncertain future land uses. The 
other is that it is not easily implemented. These are both serious limitations for which there is no 
perfect answer, but there are opportunities for lessening their impact. 
 Nearby development can have significant impacts on quality of life. Large development 
projects can increase noise, pollution and traffic while reducing aesthetic values of an area. These 
changes have both financial and emotional effects, leading to declining property values and quality of 
life. Compensating those negatively affected is a difficult prospect, in particular because of the 
inherent difficulty in pricing quality of life issues. The linkage method can handle development 
effects on an aggregate scale (like ensuring there is adequate affordable housing in a community) but 
not on a disaggregate scale. Perhaps what is needed for individual concerns such as property value 
and quality of life is a system that encourages developers gain approval of surrounding neighborhood 
organizations before developments are improved. This system has been used Fort Collins, Colorado 
with success (Humphreys and Delsohn 1985), but a more recent update of the system’s efficacy would 
be useful before making any other determinations of its value. Regardless, this method is separate 
from the Sustainable Development Deviation system, so even if Fort Collins’s system is useful, 
homeowner security is still not maintained by my method. One potential solution to this problem is 
to address the psychological issues originally raised by O’Harrow. Similar to performance zoning and 
no-zoning standards, some absolute standards could be created which ensure the worst 
incompatibilities are not allowed. While this goes against the market freedoms discussed, it is 
necessary to ensure protection of public welfare. 
 The second concern is determining how to implement the SDD method. Despite its clear 
connections with common planning practices, it is a major leap from conventional zoning. This 
method in its full form may be better suited as a theoretical exercise than as a practical zoning 
alternative. However, the need for increased market freedoms in parallel with protection of the 
public interest is real and should be attempted. Perhaps the SDD method can be adopted 
incrementally, with a few quantifiable planning concerns used on a limited basis. The stylized pricing 
schemes for affordable housing could be used without significantly altering existing planning 
practice. In addition, the absolute limits to development deviations discussed above could aid in 
implementation. If these incremental changes were successful, other ecology and equity issues (such 
as habitat conservation and ecosystem management, jobs-housing balances and lower-income transit 
accessibility) could be quantified and addressed. While this is not optimal, it may be more practical, 
and as such is worth considering. Of course, there will always be concern about determining 
appropriate pricing schemes. I suggest that instead of trying to find the best pricing scheme, 
implementing any scheme that allows for increased development deviation while still protects equity 
and ecology is worthwhile. The stylized pricing schemes presented earlier show that different 
schemes can lead to higher planning outcomes without necessarily being optimal. As long as 
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communities benefit, finding best pricing practices are secondary. It is possible that the SDD method 
may do just that.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This project attempted to critically examine the efficacy of three popular zoning alternatives. 
It was found that each has advantages, though the no-zoning alternative seemed most likely to lead to 
poor planning outcomes. Transect Planning fared relatively well in comparison to its counterparts, 
and the nascent nature of the theory gives hope that identified problems can and will be corrected in 
due time. However, no alternative solved all of zoning’s key flaws. Therefore, I argued for a new 
alternative that can incorporate increased market flexibility into accepted norms of good planning. 
The overarching purpose of this method is to account for and mitigate the changes in public goods 
that can occur from market-driven changes in land use patterns. It is hoped that its use can increase 
positive outcomes in city development and management.  
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